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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount of

alimony it awarded to Ms. Hales. The standard of appellate review
is a "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion."

Paffel v.

Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); accord Chambers v. Chambers,
840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5.

See Addendum A for a complete

recitation of that section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Course of Proceedings.
On August 12, 1991, David Hales ("Mr. Hales") filed for

divorce to dissolve his marriage of approximately 25 years to
Sandra Gillman Hales ("Ms. Hales").

The case was tried before

Judge Ray M. Harding in the Fourth Judicial District Court on
December 9, 1992, and January 12, 1993.

The divorce and property

distribution phases of the trial were bifurcated, and Judge Harding
granted the parties a divorce on December 9, 1992.
Trial resumed on January 12, 1993.

The court granted the

parties joint legal custody of their minor son, with primary
1

physical custody awarded to Ms. Hales.

Mr. Hales was ordered to

pay child support in the amount of $750.00 per month and permanent
alimony in the amount of $1,250.00 per month.
awarded

the parties1

business

Mr. Hales was

and Ms. Hales was

awarded

the

parties' residence, subject to the mortgage thereon.
Ms. Hales submitted a Motion for Reconsideration on the issue
of alimony, which the court denied.

On February 24, 1993, the

court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce.

On March 12, 1993, Ms. Hales filed her Notice

of Appeal to this Court on the issue of the alimony award.

Mr.

Hales cross-appealed.
On September 27, 1994, both parties appeared before this Court
for oral argument.

On that same date, this Court entered its

Order, concluding that the trial court's Findings of Fact were
inadequate, and remanded the case to the trial court for additional
findings and reconsideration of the alimony award based on those
findings.
On July 6, 1995, the Fourth Judicial District Court entered
its Memorandum

Decision

and

Additional

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law1, requiring Mr. Hales to pay child support in
the amount of $750.00 per month and alimony in the amount of
$1,250.00 per month.
1

The court did not issue or enter an amended

Attached as "Exhibit A."
2

Decree of Divorce.

Rather, it expressly adopted its previous

Decree2, entered on February 24, 1993, which awarded child support
in the amount of $750.00 per month and alimony in the amount of
$1,250.00 per month. On August 3, 1995, Ms. Hales filed her second
Notice of Appeal.
B.

Statement of Material Facts.

1.

The parties were married on December 21, 1967 in Orem,

Utah, a marriage of approximately 25 years.

(Exhibit A if 2; Tr.

Vol. I, p. 160. )
2.

Ms. Hales was born on June 2, 1946, and was 46 at the

time of trial.
3.

(Exhibit A 1f 4; Tr. Rec. 31.)

During the marriage the parties had two children, a

daughter and a son, born as issue of the marriage.

At the time of

trial, their daughter was eighteen years of age and their son was
fourteen.
4.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 160.)
Since the parties' separation in August of 1991, Ms.

Hales has had custody of the parties' minor son.

(Tr. Vol. I,

pp. 160-61, 163.)
5.

The parties1 minor son, Corbin, was a nationally ranked

competitive tennis player.

Substantial costs were incurred by Ms.

Hales for Corbinfs training, equipment and travel costs (including

Attached as "Exhibit B."
3

Ms. Hales1 travel costs) to attend the tournaments.

(Tr. Vol. I,

p. 161-2.)
6.

Since the parties' separation in August of 1991 to the

time the Decree of Divorce was entered, Mr. Hales did not make
mortgage or rental payments for his own benefit.

(Tr. Vol. I,

pp. 1-14.)
7.

Ms. Hales' role within the family during the entire

course of the marriage was that of full-time housewife and mother.
(Exhibit A V 4; Tr. Vol. I, p. 169.)
8.

Ms. Hales was not employed, and had not been employed at

all during the term of her marriage, with the sole exception of a
short

period

of

time

when

the

parties1

business

began

its

operations. (Exhibit A M 4; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 169-70.)
9.

Ms. Hales1 post-high school education consists of one

year of college.
10.

During

(Exhibit A V 4; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 169-70.)
the

course

of

the marriage,

and

during

the

pendency of the divorce, the only income Ms. Hales received was
money given to her by Mr. Hales.

Throughout the marriage, she was

totally dependent upon him for financial support.

(Tr. Vol. I,

pp. 171-72.)
11.

Ms. Hales1 current monthly expenses for her and the

parties' minor son total approximately $4,483.28.
pp. 196-201.)
4

(Tr. Vol. I,

12.

The court found that Mr. Hales had concealed substantial

amounts of cash from the IRS and, based on evidence presented at
trial, the court established Mr. Hales1 gross monthly income at
$8,333.00.
13.

(Exhibit A 1f 3; Tr. R e c , pp. 221-23.)
Mr. Hales1 income allowed the parties to acquire a home

with a net value of over $100,000.00, a profitable business as well
as luxury items such as two boats, one valued at $8,000.00 and the
other at $180,000.00, and a Jaguar automobile for which $30,000.00
cash was paid at the time of purchase.

(Exhibit A 1f 9-14; Tr.

Rec., pp. 221-23. )
14.

Based upon a monthly income of $8,333.00, the court fixed

Mr. Hales' monthly child support obligation at $750.00.

(Exhibit

B 1f 10; Tr. R e c , pp. 221-23.)
15.

The court likewise found that because Ms. Hales lacked

specific job skills, and considering Mr. Hales1 income, Ms. Hales
was to be awarded permanent alimony.

(Exhibit A 1f 15, Tr. R e c ,

pp. 221-23.)
16.

Despite the fact that (i) Ms. Hales--with one minor

exception— had never been employed outside the home (Exhibit A 1f
4; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 169-70); (ii) Ms. Hales lacked employable skills
or

training

(Exhibit

A

1f 15; Tr.

Rec,

pp.

221-23);

(iii)

throughout the course of their marriage Ms. Hales was entirely
dependent on Mr. Hales for financial support for herself and the
5

parties' minor son (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 171-72);

(iv) Ms. Hales*

monthly obligations totalled $4,483.28 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 196-201);
(v) Mr. Hales was not making any mortgage or rental payments for
his own benefit (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 1-14); (vi) Mr. Hales' monthly
income was found to be $8,333.00 (Exhibit A ir 3; Tr. R e c , pp. 22123); and (vii) Mr. Hales' child support obligation was to be based
on a gross monthly income of $8,333.00 (Exhibit A If 7; Tr. R e c ,
pp. 221-23), the court awarded Ms. Hales alimony in the amount of
only $1,250.00 per month (Exhibit A V 15; Tr. R e c , pp. 221-23).
17.

Ms. Hales appealed the trial court's decision regarding

the alimony award.

On September 27, 1994, the Utah Court of

Appeals heard oral arguments. On that same day, the Court remanded
the

case

to

the

trial

court

for

additional

findings

and

a

reconsideration of the award based on those findings (Exhibit D ) .
18.

On July 6, 1995, the trial court entered its Additional

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, reaffirming its alimony
award of $1,250.00, incorporating the Decree of Divorce entered on
February 24, 1993, and essentially making no new findings regarding
Ms. Hales' financial condition and need.

(Exhibit A ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in the amount of
alimony

it

awarded

to

Ms.

Hales.

The

evidence

at

trial

conclusively established that Ms. Hales was, and in all likelihood

6

would

continue

to

financial support.

be

entirely

dependent

upon

Mr.

Hales

for

The evidence also showed that Ms. Hales had

acquired no marketable skills or training.

Moreover, Mr. Hales1

income had allowed the parties to become accustomed to a lifestyle
that included luxury boats, a luxury automobile and substantial
travel.

These and other factors, resulted in Ms. Hales incurring

monthly expenses of not less than $4,483.28.

Finally, the trial

court specifically found that Mr. Hales' monthly income was not
less than $8,333.00 and the trial court further fixed child support
payments based upon that amount.
In spite of Ms. Hales' established need, long-term dependence,
absence of skills or training, accustomed lifestyle, and Mr. Hales'
relatively minor monthly expenses and clear ability to provide
support, the trial court awarded only $1,250.00 total monthly
alimony.

The trial court abused its discretion in that: (i) the

alimony award fails to take into account Ms. Hales' established
expenses and economic condition; (ii) the award of alimony fails to
equalize Mr. Hales' and Ms. Hales' standards of living; and (iii)
the award of alimony does not enable Ms. Hales to enjoy the same
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.

7

ARGUMENT
I.
THE ALIMONY AWARD FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT MS, HALES'
ESTABLISHED EXPENSES AND ECONOMIC CONDITION
It is well established that a trial court must specifically
consider the following three factors when setting an alimony award:
H

(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and (3)
the ability of the responding spouse to provide support."
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(quoting Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)).
This Court has stated unequivocally that a "![f]ailure to
analyze the parties1 circumstances in light of these three factors
constitutes an abuse of discretion.'"

Thronson v. Thronson, 810

P.2d 428, 435 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)).
In fact, the paramount factor a trial court needs to confront
in setting a proper award of alimony is the financial condition and
need of the receiving spouse:
In exercising its discretion in determining the amount of
alimony to be awarded, the trial court must consider the
financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming
support . . . .
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (emphasis
added)•
8

Here, the evidence adduced at trial established Ms, Halesf
monthly expenses at $4,483.28.

The trial court's award of child

support and alimony result in a monthly disposable income for
Ms. Hales of only $1,917.00.

Although this level of support is

grossly disproportionate to Ms. Hales' monthly needs, the trial
court failed to consider this fact, or to make specific findings of
fact regarding her financial and economic condition.

This error

alone requires a reversal of the alimony award.
In its Memorandum Decision and Additional Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that "although defendant
has no specific job skills, she is not precluded from obtaining
employment or reeducating herself in order to find some form of
suitable full-time employment."
absent

from

discussion

the record
of what

and

Exhibit A, 1f 15.

from

constitutes

the court's

suitable

Conspicuously

Findings

full-time

is any

employment,

including benefits and compensation.
Although the Findings do address Ms. Hales' lack of skill and
training, they are essentially silent as to her specific economic
condition and financial needs. However, it is clear that the trial
court did consider Ms. Hales' needs and income, together with Mr.
Hales' income, when it determined the appropriate level of child
support.

In fact, the child support award of $750.00 is based, in

accordance with the then existing uniform guidelines, on an income

9

of $0 for Ms. Hales and an established income of $8,333.00 for Mr.
Hales.
Yet,

in

its

determination

of

alimony,

the

trial

court

seemingly ignored Ms. Hales' need and lack of ability to support
herself, and Mr. Hales' ability to provide the necessary support.
The court offered no justification for its consideration of a level
of income at $0 for Ms. Hales and $8,333.00 for Mr. Hales in its
child support determination, while apparently dispensing entirely
with any consideration of these income levels in its alimony
determination.
This Court has considered awards under similar circumstances.
In Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), this
Court overturned the trial court's award of temporary alimony of
one year's duration.

The Court found that the appellant required

$800.00 per month support to meet her needs, and that, based on his
income and living expenses, the appellee had some discretionary
income with which to meet her economic needs. See e.g., Schaumberg
v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (award upheld on
appeal where appellee testified to a need of $2,272.58 and award,
along

with

other

income,

gave

her

a

disposable

income

of

$2,389.00).
Here, the trial court's award of $1,250.00 will leave Ms.
Hales with a substantial

shortfall of income compared
10

to her

established needs of $4,483.28.

Furthermore, Mr. Halesf monthly

income of $8,333.00 leaves him with considerable discretionary
income.

The record and the trial court's express Findings do not

support the award of alimony in the amount of $1,250.00.

An

established monthly financial need of $4,483.28 cannot fit into an
alimony award of only $1,250.00, particularly where, as here, the
trial court has made no finding as to how Ms. Hales can be expected
to support herself.

The trial court's failure to consider Ms.

Hales established economic needs and condition is an abuse of
discretion that must be remedied by this Court.
II.
THE ALIMONY AWARD FAILS TO EQUALIZE MR. HALES1 AND MS. HALES1
STANDARDS OF LIVING
The Utah Court of Appeals has instructed that "alimony should,
as far as possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of
living."

Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

(citing Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Ut.Ct.App. 1988)).
The trial court's failure to enter an award of alimony which would
allow Ms. Hales to continue to enjoy her marital standard of living
is all the more objectionable in light of the fact that this
failure leaves the parties with grossly disproportionate standards
of living.

11

Based on a monthly gross income of $8,333.00, Mr. Hales would
have a disposable income of $3,534.00 after paying his taxes,
alimony, and child support, assuming the figures below:
Gross income

$8,r333
3
1,,6821

Federal Income Tax
FICA

7083

State Income Tax

4093
1,,250

Alimony

750

Child Support

$3,534
It should be noted that Mr. Hales' child support obligation
will end soon, leaving him with a disposable income of $4,284.00.
Ms. Hales, on the other hand, would have disposable income of
$1,917.00 after paying her taxes based on receipt of the trial
court's award of $750.00 child support and $1,250.00 alimony, as
set forth below:
Gross income-child support
Gross income-alimony
Federal Income Tax
State Income Tax

3
4
5

$

750
1,250
- 644
195
$1,917

See Tr. R e c , p. 228 for calculation of these amounts,
See Tr. R e c , p. 228 for calculation of these amounts.
See Tr. R e c , p. 227 for calculation of these amounts,
12

Of course, after Mr. Hales* child support obligation ceases,
Ms. Hales1 disposable income will drop to $1,167.00. This division
of disposable income is inequitable on its face, particularly in
light of the parties1 long term marriage and the specific finding
of the trial court that Ms. Hales lacked the skill, training and
experience necessary to allow her to meet her own economic needs.
In determining an award of alimony in a divorce, the trial
court is obligated to divide the income equitably.

As the Utah

Supreme Court has plainly stated:
The overarching aim of a property division,
and of the decree of which it and the alimony
award are subsidiary parts, is to achieve a
fair, just and equitable result between the
parties.
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added)
see also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (one
of the primary considerations in achieving such fairness and equity
is to equalize the parties' respective standards of living).
This Court has not hesitated to remand alimony awards which
fail to equalize the parties' standards of living.

In

Howell v.

Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), the defendant testified
to monthly expenses of approximately $5,000.00.
a monthly income of $10,000.00 per month.

The plaintiff had
The court awarded

alimony and child support in the amount of $3,163.00, and found

13

that the defendant had the ability to earn a salary of $645.00 per
month.
This Court held that this award was insufficient, noting that,
after plaintiff's child support obligation ceased, he would have a
gross monthly income of $8,200.00, in comparison to defendant's
income of $2,445.00.

The Court noted that "[t]he alimony set by

the court does not come close to equalizing the parties' standard
of living as of the time of the divorce, but allows plaintiff a two
to four times advantage."

Id. at 1213.

Here, the difference between Mr. Hales' disposable income of
$3,534.00 and Ms. Hales' disposable income of $1,917.00 represents
a disparity of almost 2:1; for every dollar of disposable income
available to Mr. Hales, Ms. Hales has but $0.50.

Additionally, Ms.

Hales' personal expenses are $4,483.28 a month while, at the time
of trial, Mr. Hales was making no mortgage, rent or utility
payments on his own behalf.

The inequity of the trial court's

distribution of income is stark and undeniable.

The award of

alimony must be overturned on this basis alone, and an award
entered which meets the required goal of equalizing the parties'
standards of living. An alimony award of $2,392.00 which equitably
divides Mr. Hales' net income would meet this goal.

14

III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD FAILS TO ENABLE
MS. HALES TO MAINTAIN THE SAME STANDARD OF
LIVING SHE ENJOYED DURING THE MARRIAGE
Utah courts have clearly set forth the purposes of an award of
alimony.

The paramount purpose is to:

enabl[e] the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage, and preventing the receiving spouse from
becoming a public charge.
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990).
Although there are circumstances where there is simply not
enough to go around, that is not the case here.

The trial court

made the express finding that Mr. Hales had a monthly income of
$8,333.00.

That income allowed the parties to acquire substantial

assets, including a successful business which the parties built
together, a home valued at over $100,000.00, two boats, one valued
at $8,000.00 and the other at $180,000.00, a Jaguar automobile for
which $30,000.00 cash was paid at the time of purchase, and
substantial travel in connection with the tennis activities of the
parties1 minor son.

Furthermore, when setting Mr. Hales1 income,

the court did not take into account Mr. Hales' established practice
of spending large sums of cash, and providing Ms. Hales with cash
for spending money and expenses.
The evidence further established that Mr. HalesT
expenses were minimal.

personal

At the time of the divorce, he was not
15

making any mortgage payments (other than payments on the parties'
residence made on behalf of Ms. Hales), rent, or utility payments.
Finally, the evidence established that Ms. Hales' monthly expenses
totalled not less than $4,483.28, that Ms. Hales lacked employable
skills or training and that she was entirely dependent on Mr. Hales
for financial

support for herself and the parties' minor son

throughout the course of their marriage.
The evidence and findings set forth above do address Mr.
Hales' ability to provide support and Ms. Hales' inability to
produce a sufficient income for herself, two of the factors to be
considered when setting an alimony award.

Chambers, 840 P.2d at

843. Specifically, Mr. Hales' income, which allowed the parties to
enjoy

a

well-to-do

diminished,

nor

had

standard
Mr.

of

Hales

living,

incurred

had

not

expenses

materially
which

would

materially affect his ability to provide support for Ms. Hales.
Ms. Hales, on the other hand, is not capable of providing any
significant level of support, certainly not a level sufficient to
meet her monthly needs of $4,483.28.
Simply stated, the Hales established a comfortable standard of
living during their marriage which Ms. Hales is not capable of
maintaining on her own.

Mr. Hales, however, continues to be able

to provide Ms. Hales the financial support necessary to allow her
to continue her established lifestyle.
16

The evidence and findings

are beyond dispute.

Accordingly, there is no reason why Ms. Hales

is not entitled to a continuation of the same level of support she
enjoyed

during

the

marriage.

The

trial

court

offered

no

explanation for impermissibly awarding alimony in an amount less
than half of what Ms. Hales is legally and factually entitled to.
In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991), this
Court affirmed that, while one purpose of alimony is to allow the
receiving spouse to maintain the marital standard of living, an
alimony award should also consider the receiving spouse's "station
in life."

Id. at 1212.

Therefore, the trial court's award of

$1,800.00 a month was remanded where the receiving spouse was in
her fifties, had been a homemaker throughout the marriage, and had
no job skills.

Under such circumstances, this Court found that

[i]t is entirely unrealistic to assume that a
woman in her mid-50's with no substantial work
experience or training will be able to enter
the job market and support herself in anything
even resembling the style in which the couple
had been living.
Id. at 1213 (citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985)); see also Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Ut.Ct.App.
1988) (alimony award should be affirmed to allow wife of twelve
years to maintain her marital standard of living, in light of the
fact that she had no professional training and few marketable
skills);

Morgan

v. Morgan,

854 P.2d

559

(Utah Ct.App.

1993)

(alimony award upheld where receiving spouse's role was that of
17

homemaker, and income from property division would be insufficient
to allow her to maintain her marital standard of living).
Here, it is no less unrealistic for the trial court to expect
Ms. Hales—who

herself

is approaching her fifties and has no

substantial work experience or training--to be able to support
herself in a style even remotely resembling her marital standard of
living on an alimony award of $1,250.00.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in setting an award of
alimony which fails to realize the goals of alimony under Utah law.
The award fails for three reasons. First, it fails to consider Ms.
Halesf

demonstrated

financial

needs

and

economic

condition.

Second, it fails to equalize the parties1 disposable income.
Third, it fails to allow Ms. Hales to maintain the standard of
living she enjoyed during her marriage.
Because the trial court's award of alimony is not supported by
adequate

factual

findings, it must be reversed, and an award

entered commensurate with Ms. Hales' needs and inability to provide
for her own support, and Mr. Hales' ability to provide support.
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Additionally, Ms. Hales requests an award of attorneys fees
and costs incurred in this appeal.
DATED this / Q

day of February, 1996.
MAACK & SI

JUARK W.
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
KRISTINE EDDE
Attorneys for Appellant
Sandra Gillman Hales
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / ^

day of February 1996, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed,
postage prepaid, first-class, to:
Ellen Maycock
Pamela S. Nighswonger
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway

S a l t Lake City, Utah
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MEMORANDUM
DECISION
AND
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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Memorandum Decision
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Exhibit A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DAVID HALES,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 914401*06

vs.

DATE: July 6, 1995

SANDRA GILLMAN HALES,
Defendant.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder
EXTERN: Andrew Pickering

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on December 9,
1992 and was thereafter continued to January 12, 1993 at which time trial, following
argument of counsel for the parties, was concluded. The Court heard and considered the
evidence and testimony presented by the parties and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on February 24, 1993.
The matter was thereafter appealed and cross-appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals
and on September 27, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its conclusion and decision,
remitting the case for the entry of additional findings of fact and reconsideration of the
awards based on those findings.
The Court, pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals that additional
findings be made in this matter, with reconsideration of all awards based on those findings,
makes and enters the following Additional Findings of Fact and Additional Conclusions of
Law.
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ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and have been for

more than three months prior to filing this divorce action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 21, 1967 in Orem, Utah.

3.

Plaintiff was 49 years old at the time of trial, and has been self-employed at Myrons

Auto Wrecking, 1775 South State Street^ Orem, Utah, since February, 1980. Plaintiff is
employed on a full-time basis. The Court finds that Plaintiffs gross monthly income is
$8,333.00.
4.

The Court finds that Defendant's role within the family during the course of the

marriage has been that of a full-time housewife and mother. Defendant was 46 years old at
the time of trial, is a high school graduate with one year of college training, and has been a
full-time housewife and mother during the marriage. Defendant has been employed during
the marriage for a brief period of time while helping Plaintiff when the parties' business
operations commenced. Defendant currently has no monthly income from employment.
5.

The Court finds that during the course of the marriage the parties had two children: a

daughter, Angila, born November 22, 1968; and a son, Corbin, born July 19, 1978. At the
time of trial, Angila had reached the age of majority, and is not a consideration in the
determination of any awards made. However, at the time of trial Corbin had not reached the
age of majority.
6.

The Court finds that the stipulation for custody and visitation which the parties have

entered into with regard to their minor son Corbin is fair, just, and equitable and in the child's
best interests. Each of the parties should be awarded joint legal custody of Corbin, with the
Defendant being awarded the primary physical custody subject to Plaintiffs rights to
reasonable visitation.
7.

Based on findings that Plaintiff has a gross monthly income of $8,333.00 and that

Defendant has no gross monthly income, the Court finds that Plaintiff is to pay child support
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in the amount of $750.00 per month. This award is to be paid to the Defendant on the first
of each month. Child support shall continue until the attainment by Corbin of the age of
eighteen years or his graduation from high school with his regular graduating class, whichever
is later.
8.

The Court finds that Plaintiff is able to provide insurance on behalf of Corbin through

his employment opportunities; however,3efendant is unemployed and has no easy access to
insurance. Therefore, it is reasonable and just that Plaintiff maintain his present medical and
life insurance for the benefit of Corbin. The Court also finds that Plaintiff is to name Corbin
as beneficiary of the term life insurance policy which he currently maintains. It is reasonable
and just that each party be liable for one-half of all of Corbin's medical expenses not covered
by insurance.
9.

The Court finds that the parties' equity interests in the business located at 1775 South

State Street, Orem, Utah, (equity interest approximately $44,000.00) and the house located at
1595 East 480 South, Pleasant Grove, Utah, (equity interest approximately $60,000.00) are
essentially equal. Furthermore, Plaintiff has had substantial experience in business operations,
while Defendant has had very little business experience. Therefore, the Court finds that it is
reasonable and just to award all right, title and interest in and to the business to Plaintiff,
subject to the mortgage on that property, and to award all right, title, and interest in and to
the house to Defendant, subject to the mortgage on that property.
10.

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Court finds the Carver boat to have a

value of $180,000.00. It is reasonable and just that the Carver boat be sold, and the proceeds
equally divided between the parties, or if the Plaintiff elects, he may retain the boat and pay
$90,000.00 to Defendant. Plaintiff shall make such election and payment, if any, within 90
days of the date of the decree.
11.

The Court further finds that it is reasonable and just that Plaintiff assume the following

debts and obligations and hold Defendant harmless therefrom:

3

000

33

4

(a)

Mortgage on the business located at 1775 South State Street, Orem, Utah,
approximately $111,772.00;

(b)

All other documented debts associated with the business located at 1775 South
State Street, Orem, Utah;

(c)

First Security Bank credit line, approximately $40,000.00 at $336.00 per
month;

(d)

R.C. Willey credit line, approximately $300.00 at $25.00 per month;

(e)

Visa credit card balance, approximately $790.98 at $25.00 per month;

(f)

Mastercard credit card balance, approximately $3951.22 at $150.00 per month;

(g)

Boat slip obligation, at approximately $305.00 per month;

(h)

All costs associated with Corbin's tennis expenses which have not yet been
paid and are outstanding, whether on a credit card balance or as a loan not the
subject of the other debts and obligations the Plaintiff is to assume set forth
above;

(i)

All other documented personal debts presently outstanding incurred by the
parties.

12.

The Court finds that it is reasonable and just that Defendant assume the following

debts and obligation and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom:
(a)

First mortgage on the house at 1595 East 480 South, Pleasant Grove, Utah,
approximately $25,000.00 at $366.00 per month.

13.

The Court finds that it is reasonable and just that Plaintiff be awarded the following

personal property:
(a)

The IRA currently in his name, valued at $4,223.00;

(b)

The 1989 Ford truck, valued at $5,000.00;

(c)

Jewelry valued at $2,500.00;

(d)

The GlasTron (small) boat, valued at $8,000.00;
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(e)

Ili(Ji kcougji ii'ioiuil, '»,iliit*il ii 1 I 1 "'

"""""

The combined value of the personal property so a^ardcJ ; .

).

14. . The Court finds that it is reasonable and just thai Dei, uiam be awarded the following
personal property:
The i°87 Jaeuar XJS, valued at Si
(t

*'•: -

h - i.^nvc i^rn.sninus assOciatec u ^ i \*) nouse at 1595 East 480 South,
rleajant Gr^ve. 1 tali. aLed r

;

'

(c^

Jewelry val ,ed at $>,r< •

(d)

The ERA currently in her name, valued at $1,927.00.

The combined value of the personal property so awarded is S'! 8,427,00, The Court finds 'that
this award is fair and equitable in light of the distribution of the business and associated
pro* -", :
15.

;.< t-- % -v. th-.* AI: e^

Basee ,%n -j.e abo\

endings jegarding the

.-••

"

/.*• ..**.•-.;.. s*

earning potential, the Court finds that Plaintiff is jHe to pro. de suppc. ;oi Detendani -• -j.e
form of alimony. The parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during the marriage, and the
:

Court finds that Defendant; is capable of continuing to enjoy

similar lifestyle with an

alimony award of $1,250 00, a khud -u^vv^ .rw- * -.*f $"^0

-\ the IRA funds awarded her,

the equitj ii I the hoi ise, an ::i .-• t ;o^-ed^ : ..

,*s a :e **r of Plaintiffs election

.

regarding the Carver boat (approximate'* S ^- 'v<

vei.
•

•

s; Unduiys

regarding attorney's fees as set i u M o w are taken into account in maxi.:g r-.s finding

I hi*

Court finds further that though Defendant has no specific job skills, she is not precluded from .
obtaining employment or reeducating herself in order to find some form of suitable full-time
employment. Therefore, considering the division of property, the circumstances and needs of
t .. > ait ,
entitled

Pla* %f:\ abihtv to provide support, the Court finds that Defendant is
:• /

i

^

awird shaw continue unu :h. vioa-!

'

amount of $1,250.00 pei i i lonth. I his alimonj "
/.i

of the parties, the Defendant's remarnag*:
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Defendant's cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex, and shall be paid on the first day
of each month.
17.

Based on the respective needs of the parties and the previously entered findings as to

income, debt assumption, and property distribution, the Court finds that Defendant has hired
an attorney to represent her in this matter, and is in less of a position to be able to pay
attorney's fees. Therefore, Defendant is^o be awarded judgment for reasonable attorney's fees
in the amount of $8,000.00.
18.

All other Findings of Fact previously made by the Court as entered February 24, 1993

which are not specifically superseded by these additional findings are adopted herein, and are
found to be fair, just, and equitable.
Based on the foregoing Additional Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the
following:

ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court adopts herein in all respects the Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce

previously made and entered on February 24, 1993.
Dated this 6th day of July, 1995.

cc:

Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Thomas V. Rasmussen, Esq.
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Exhibit B

THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, -'- i
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS, #4 699
MORTON, SKEEN & RASMUSSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-3000

IN THE DISTRICT CCUF"1 ^T

RTH ""T5ICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR UTAh

MATE OF UTAH

DA\ rTD HALES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
Civ i ] No,

vs.

91 -44 014 0 6 DA

J udge Ra} I I Har c:i ing
Defendant.
The abcve-ent tied matter cantthe Honorable °~

regularly for trial before

H^~d*~~ ~~ -~~ A+-- ^

w -

. - ^ecpmber, 1?92 and
. , -. ^

time trial ^ J . G O ; eluded.

Plaintiff appeared

stages ?-* ~ r - :ri?

represented

Ra:; * :„j

and t*

;

: -:: i

• —s

-. j-r
person

. •. : - -

provided evidence and testimony to the .\ u
;

•- il .

-^ nsel Thr^.as V,

and w a s iepresentea by ner counsel Clark W. Sessions,

t -

-w.ich

•

3otn tarties

ifter which ~N- r^i~~

•

this matter ar.; i: . \ * n^ i-v .ew--j a* . w i a - ^ e

i

L. ~ ; en ted <i :a the

testimony ;: the parties and their respective witnesses, and the
Coi lr t

ai I I RXM* •

:

and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant on
the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final
upon execution and entry herein,
2.

Each of the parties are awarded the joint legal custody of

the parties minor child with Defendant being awarded

primary

physical custody, subject to Plaintifffs rights to reasonable and
liberal visitation.
3. Plaintiff is ordered to pay existing expenses for "tennis"
which have not been paid and are outstanding as a credit card
balance or loan.

In the event Plaintiff fails to pay said sums,

said sums shall be reduced to judgment.
4.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay all documented

business and personal debts presently outstanding and shall hold
Defendant harmless from liability thereon with the exception of the
first mortgage on the parties1 home which is to be assumed and paid
by Defendant holding Plaintiff harmless from liability thereon.
5.

Plaintiff is ordered to maintain present medical and life

insurance coverage for the benefit of the parties1 minor child.
Plaintiff

is

ordered

to

name

the

parties1

beneficiary of the life insurance policy.
responsible

minor

child

as

Each party shall be

for payment of one-half of all the minor child's

medical expenses not covered by insurance.
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6.

efendant - 3 awarded the parties 1 home free and c] ear of

a

!' '; i ita}e c f

I 11 I =i r

a s s 1 imp t i o 1: 1 o f !::: h • =

f :i r s t

mortgage thereon.
7.

P l a i n t i f f Is awarded h:s b u s i n e s s a n d p r o p e r t y a s s o c i a t e d

therewi t:l 1 fr • = •• = f] : • :: 11 <

'

.

i"

of all encumbrances thereon.
8.

Each of t h e parties are awarded the following personal

proper I::;; > :
To the Plaintiff:

xr

^

$4,223.00
5,000.00
:,50o.oo
8.ooo,00

iiasTron)
7 inf1

9.
been

In

Jaguar
I lone Furnishings
Jewelry
IRA

"**rcies a r e ordered 'to

-

-

20,000.00
5,000.00

\*v.

stipulated to have a va 1 ue -• .

p.s^

.h h a s

.. . * .3 the

proceeds from, t h e sale of said bca* equal.
to r e t a i " t h ° r~*- 3 nd pay Defendant *">•'* ^ :

::ci^ -

: .5 in tiff sia\ elect
%s

*

"^ d ~ l ^ ~ t ^ T n a n d

r-J t:h i n '

jee o f

Divorce.
efenda^*" is awardsi child support for t h e parties 1 M n T
\ lpOI 1 I: ] "I L i l t I I 1 • 1 j. J :-.-.$

Chi

monthly
xx.

income or . ^ , 33 5. •_ J ,
Defendant

is awarded permanent alimony
3

In t h e sum of

1

$1,250,00 per month.

Said alimony shall continue until the death

of either party, Defendant's remarriage or unlawful co-habitation
with an individual of the opposite sex.
12. Defendant is awarded judgment against Plaintiff in the sum
of $8,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
DATED THIS

day of February, 1993.
BY THEUCOURT

RAY M. HARDING
J——
DV^t^ict Court JudgefV
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify this

JUL
day of February, 1993, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce was mailed, by
placing the same in the United States Mail, postage pre-paid,
addressed as follows:
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Dean C. Adreason, Esq.
Robert W. Cottle, Esq.
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(MWUL

Hales.dec
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Exhibit C

DIVORCE

!{()•;J !

30-3-5

Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
History: R-S. 189S & CJL 1907, § 1?12; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1);

added Subsection (2); designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4);
inserted "In determining" and "the court" in
Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); divided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substituting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless
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David H a l e s ,
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ORDER
Case No. 930158-CA

v.
Sandra Gillman Hales,
Defendant, Appellant, and
Cross-Appellee.

Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Greenwood.
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
We conclude that the findings of fact are inadequate.
Accordingly, we remand for entry of additional findings and
reconsideration of the awards based on those findings.
DATED this 27th day of September, 1994.

Gregoj^K.^Jrme, Judge

. Greenwood,1 Judge
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Thomas V. Rasmussen
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Dated this 27th day of September, 1994.
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